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Abstract
The agency problem between patients and doctors has long been emphasised in the
health economics literature, but the empirical evidence on whether patients can evaluate
and respond to better quality care remains mixed and inconclusive. Using household data
linked to an assessment of village doctors’ clinical competence in rural China, we show
that there is no correlation between doctor competence and patients’ healthcare utili-
sation, with confidence intervals reasonably tight around zero. Household perceptions of
quality are an important determinant of care seeking behaviour yet patients appear unable
to recognise more competent doctors -there is no relationship between doctor competence
and perceptions of quality.
Key Words: Doctor Competence, Quality of Care, Perceptions, Item Response Theory
JEL Classification: I12, I15, I18, C29.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long emphasized the problem of asymmetrical information in the provision of
healthcare with patients finding it difficult to evaluate the quality of services (Arrow, 1963;Ar-
row, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Dranove and White, 1987; Gaynor, 1994; Glied and
Remler, 2002; Mooney and Ryan, 1993). Patients do not have specialist knowledge of their
condition and there is an inherent unpredictability in how individuals respond to medical care
(Arrow, 1963). Indeed patients seek care precisely because they lack the medical training and
expertise of their doctor. In many countries it falls to regulatory bodies to enforce quality of
care standards, partly because patients are not thought to be able to recognize and respond to
better quality.
At the same time patients are not considered completely ignorant. Policies seeking to expand
patient choice, for example, are seen as a way of sharpening provider incentives to deliver quality
care and rest on the idea of the patient as an intelligent consumer. Such policies encouraging
competition, however, remain controversial and the evidence is mixed (Cooper et al., 2011;
Bloom et al., 2010; Propper et al., 2004; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Pollock et al., 2011).
Many theoretical analyses model patient demand as a function of quality and assume the market
can impose some discipline on the behavior of physicians (Chalkley and Tilley, 2005; Chalkley
and Khalil, 2005; Ma and T. McGuire, 1997). There are multiple channels through which
patients can infer quality, the most obvious being through repeated exposure to health services
(Corno, 2014). However, as emphasised by the literature on empirical industrial organisation,
(see seminal work by Perloff and Salop, 1985, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995 as well as the
survey article by Einav and Levin, 2010) the accuracy of consumers’ inferences, and those of
patients in particular, are likely to be variable and ridded by unobserved heterogeneity. As a
result, how the demand for healthcare is affected by quality remains an empirical question.
In this paper, we examine the correlates of demand for primary healthcare in rural China,
using novel data on health providers linked to household information on health care seeking.
Our analysis focuses on the relationship between doctor competence and utilization of health-
care at the primary level. Village doctors are meant to be the first point of contact under the
rural health system in China, providing primary care services to the rural population under the
management of township health centres (Barbiarz et al., 2012). Strengthening primary care
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is a key focus of the latest health care reforms (Chen, 2009; Yip et al., 2012) and ultimately
the intention is that village doctors will act as gatekeepers to higher tiers of healthcare in the
public system (Yip and Hsiao, 2009; Yip et al., 2012).
Much of the existing literature on determinants of health care utilization focuses on the
more observable dimensions of health care, such as prices, location and the availability of
staff, drugs, equipment and infrastructure. Our contribution relates to a second strand of the
literature which examines whether patients are sensitive to technical aspects of quality that are
harder for patients to observe and typically difficult to measure. Such measures of technical
quality usually relate to diagnosis and treatment taking place during the interaction between the
patient and clinician, referred to process of care in the quality of care literature (Donabedian,
1988; Donabedian, 2005). Process measures are generally informed by well-conducted clinical
trials or observational studies that have demonstrated their effectiveness on health outcomes
(Donabedian, 1988).
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide some context by describing the study
setting and ongoing health reforms at the time of the research. We then outline our approach to
measuring doctor competence as well as other important features of the data, before describing
our statistical methods. Finally, we present the results, interpret the findings, and discuss
possible implications for policy.
2 Study Setting
Our study is located in Ningxia, a low income province in the Northwest part of China. It has
a population of 6.25 million. The ethnic composition is 63 percent Han and 36 percent Hui.
With a per capita annual income of 15,551 RMB in urban areas and 6,627 RMB in rural areas,
Ningxia was the third poorest province in China in 2009 (Ningxia Statistical Yearbook, 2010).
Life expectancy at the time of the study was 74 years. Expansion of health insurance through
the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) has been rapid. Introduced in 2003, the NCMS
is now estimated to cover more than 95 percent of the rural population.
Healthcare provision at the village level has a long history in China. Since the 1950s
Great Leap Forward, and until Deng Xiaopings economic reforms in the 1980s, agricultural
production in rural China was organised in communes, each encompassing several production
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brigades. During this period land was owned by the state and collectivism was prioritised over
individual labour. Within this system, rural health financing was organised around communal
medical funds which contribute to the Rural Cooperative Medical System. Yet, despite the
existence of this formal system, by the 1960s delivery of health care in rural areas was still
scarce (McConnell, 1993, Zhang and Unschuld, 2008, White, 1988). This led to the introduction
of a national policy on barefoot doctors by which teams of doctors from urban hospitals were
mobilised to rural areas to care and train local paramedics.
The village healthcare providers or barefoot doctors of the 1960s were selected and paid by
the Rural Cooperative Medical System. These individuals received between 3 and 6 months of
training, with an emphasis on prevention of epidemics and the treatment of common diseases.
These doctors had limited capabilities, earning about 50 percent less than regular physicians
and, as members of a commune they had to earn work points to pay for their food and other
goods at the end of the year. With the introduction of Deng Xiaopings economic reforms,
the commune system collapsed and with it the cooperative medical insurance, and so barefoot
doctors lost their institutional and financial support. Barefoot doctors were renamed “village
doctors”and they were required to pass a formal examination before they could practice, and
allowed to charge for services and drug dispensation. More recently, in recognition of the
problem of over-prescription and expenditure growth, the Government of Ningxia introduced
in 2006 a zero drug profit policy for village clinics and township health centres. This had a
substantial impact on these providers’ income, especially village clinics, that used to earn over
95 percent of their revenue from drug sales.
While the public sector dominates healthcare provision in our study province and indeed
China, patients have choice whether and at what level to seek care. In the province where
this study was located, policymakers expressed particular concern over the escalating costs
associated with increasing numbers of patients going directly to hospitals to seek care. There
is no gatekeeper system preventing patients from bypassing primary care providers and going
directly to higher level hospitals.
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3 Data
We use primary data collected from several sources in five counties of Ningxia province. The
first source is a household survey conducted in 2011. The sampling frame consisted of the
universe of all towns, villages and households in the study area. In each county we sampled
every town and then stratified villages according to their economic situation (i.e. rich, middle,
poor). We selected 40 percent of villages in each stratum using a random number generator.
Within each sampled village, we randomly selected between 20 and 33 households. In total,
the universe of the sample was 75 towns, comprising 917 villages and 357,400 households. A
total of 6,612 households (28,890 individuals) were interviewed in 260 villages.
We exploit data from several modules in the household survey on: i) basic household and
individual characteristics; ii) illness, injury and outpatient visits; and iii) perceptions of quality
of care. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the household data. Educational attainment
is relatively low with 27 percent of individuals never attending school. Average consumption
in the sample is 5,407 RMB per capita, substantially below the national average. Healthcare
utilization is measured as a binary variable indicating whether the individual sought care in
the past two weeks if ill. More than 10 percent of individuals were ill in the past two weeks.
Of these, 15 percent sought no treatment and 34 percent self-treated. Individuals are most
likely to seek care from village doctors (18 percent), followed by county hospitals (13 percent)
and township health centres (13 percent). The private sector caters to only 5 percent of sick
individuals.
The head of each household was asked to evaluate the quality of care provided by the village
doctor serving their community, irrespective of whether care had been sought. Perceptions of
quality were assessed on score of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) across a number of dimensions
including waiting times, facility environment, politeness of doctor, description of illness by
doctor, drug availability, sophistication of the equipment, and ability of the doctor. To generate
an aggregate score we convert the score for each dimension to a z-score with mean zero and
standard deviation one and take the unweighted average across all z-scores. Table 1 presents
the data, showing that village doctors score worst on sophistication of the equipment and best
on waiting times.
We link data on individuals interviewed in the household survey to data on their village
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doctor collected at the same time. This matching is performed at the village level. Of the
260 clusters sampled in the household survey, village doctors in 247 villages were interviewed.
Two tools were used. First, a questionnaire was administered to collect information on the
characteristics of the doctor, the services provided and sources of revenue. Second, respon-
dents were asked to complete a 35 item knowledge test that sought to assess the clinical com-
petence of the village doctor. Designed specifically for the study, questions were developed
following the national clinic guidelines on primary health care by two qualified Chinese doc-
tors. Each question concerned patient cases that village doctors are expected to be able to
manage. The test involved multiple choice questions and a short case study involving a num-
ber of questions based on the description of the case. The questionnaires are all available at
www.publichealth.ox.ac.uk/ningxiaproject.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the sample of village doctors. The majority of
doctors are male with an average age of 44 years, having worked as a doctor for 22 years. Two-
thirds of the village doctors were barefoot doctors prior to the reforms of village healthcare.
Over one-third have less than middle school education. Two-thirds have specialised in Chinese
medicine, Western medicine or both.
4 Methods.
4.1 Measuring competence.
The responses of doctors to the 35-question, multiple choice questionnaire were used to produce
a synthetic index of competence. We regard competence or technical knowledge of the doctor
as a pre-requisite for implementing best practice. In the absence of a fixed standard (such
as a national benchmark or a history of testing) we cannot assess the difficulty of the test or
its ability to discern competence levels. For that reason, our index was computed using Item
Response Theory (IRT), a technique widely used in the fields of psychometry and education
(Lord, 1962, Lord, 1969). Under certain parametric assumptions, IRT produces a competence
index that takes into consideration the difficulty and discrimination ability of each question
in the test. IRT assumes the existence of a latent competence parameter for each individual,
θi, which is imperfectly revealed by respondents’ answers to the questions in a particular test.
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This competence parameter determines the likelihood of answering each item correctly, which
is summarised in the Item Characteristic Curve,
P(Xig = 1|θi) = P(Xig = 1; ag, bg, cg|θi) = cg + (1− cg)
1 + exp(−ag(θi − bg)) (4.1)
where X is an indicator taking value 1 if item g has been answered correctly. The scalar cg
is a guessing parameter incorporating the fact that on multiple choice exams, even the least
capable individual (θ → −∞) can guess correctly. The scalar bg measures the difficulty of an
item. It is a location parameter marking the point of the latent variable where the probability
of correctly answering the question is halfway between the floor given by cg and the maximum.
The lower bg the more easily somebody with ability θ will answer correctly. Finally, ag is the
discrimination parameter, which is proportional to the slope of Prob(θ) at θ = bj and measures
the ability of the item to distinguish between values of the latent variable that are close ot each
other in the neighbourhood of its difficulty. Under the above parameterisation, the likelihood
function for the sample equals
`(a, b, c|θi) =
N∏
i=1
G∏
g=1
P(Xig = 1|θi)xig(1− P(Xig = 1|θi))1−xig (4.2)
Unlike standardised scores, the synthetic score provided by IRT takes into account the traits
of the test. In particular, note that as the discrimination parameter tends to 0, ai → 0,
the distribution in (4.1) converges to a constant, the gradient of the likelihood function with
respect to item i converges to 0. Estimation of the models is discussed in Das and Hammer
(2004). The literature has developed three main approaches. Conditional maximum likelihood,
Bayesian estimation and multiple imputation. The latter method, also referred to as Plausible
Values by Das and Hammer (2004), was introduced in Mislevy et al. (1992), and treats θi as a
missing observations. If θi is missing at random, imputation can produce unbiased estimates of
θi, ai, bi and ci as well as good estimates of the variance of the competence scores, while both
Bayesian and Likelihood criteria produce biased estimates of the variance and, therefore, cannot
be informative about the distribution of knowledge. In particular, Bayesian methods provide a
lower bound for the variance of θi while maximum likelihood produces an upper bound for the
variance of θi. Therefore, our synthetic index of competence is constructed using the Plausible
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Values approach1.
For robustness, we complete the analysis including a second index of competence, namely
the average of standardized scores. This indicator weights each question (or item) equally
regardless of its difficulty or ability to discriminate competence.
The results of the multiple choice test are given in figures 1 to A2 and table A1 in the
Appendix. To assess the overall reliability of the test, we computed Cronbach’s Alpha, which
took a value of 0.74, indicating a good (albeit low stakes) test (see Cronbach, 1951). The
number of questions answered correctly per individual was generally low. Figure 1 shows
that the best score was 29 correct answers, while the median of the distribution was located
at 16. Table A1 lists the 35 questions asked as well as the proportion of individuals who
correctly responded each of the questions. This table reveals that no question was answered
correctly by all doctors, although several questions were poorly addressed. This can be due
to a general lack of competence or a too difficult test. To cast some light on this matter, we
plotted figure 2 and figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Figure 2 explores the relationship
between the estimated difficulty and discrimination parameter from the three parameter logistic
model. We plot the predicted three parameter logistic model for each of the times listed in
table A1. The figure reveals that the estimated difficulty of the items (β in equation 4.1) is
generally large and positive (typically exceeds 1) which suggests that, indeed, most questions
were difficult for the population under study. Nonetheless, the figure reveals that there is a
good spread of difficulty among items. This is important as it determines the ability of the test
to discriminate competence among doctors. Although difficult questions are, on average, better
at discriminating levels of competence, the U-shape of the local polynomial regression reveals
that some of the easiest questions have very high discrimination power. This is the case of items
14 (suffocation of injured individuals), 12 (treatment for infantile diarrhoea), 1 (treatment of
senile hypertension) and 19 (the WHO’s recommendation of a persons daily intake of salt). The
1The additional information provided by IRT comes at the expense of three additional assumptions. Firstly,
competence is assumed to be a unidimensional object and, therefore, any test is assumed to capture this param-
eter only and not other factors such as, for example, motivation. Secondly, individuals’ traits are uninformative
about the likelihood of answering an item correctly, once competence has been established. In particular, en-
vironmental factors (such as access to medical technology) are assumed innocuous. Finally, for a fixed level of
competence, the likelihood of answering any item correctly is independent of the likelihood of answering any
other item correctly. Despite the restrictive nature of the above assumptions, all doctors in our sample face very
similar working conditions and reimbursement rates, so that the work in relatively homogeneous professional
environments and our questionnaires did not have any tree structure so that answers to each item can safely be
assumed to be independent, given ability. Therefore, the assumptions underpinning IRT do not seem conflicting
with our scenario
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figure also identifies which questions have above average discrimination power, given difficulty.
Among these we find items 28 (effect of bezoar stones), 24 (sciatica treatment for lumbar
disc injury) 21 (principles of treatment of high blood pressure) 5 (characterisation of bile duct
stone). Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix plot estimated Item Characteristic Curves and the
empirical proportions of correct answers given estimated competence. The figures reveal that
the questions with above average discrimination power are those with a rich distribution of
correct answers, given competence, where the logistic model can provide a good fit. These are
the questions that will receive more weight when constructing the synthetic competence index.
On the contrary, too easy items (such as items 2 and 3) or too difficult items (such as items
8, 28 or 29) are treated by the logistic model as uninformative. Overall, the individuals in the
sample found the test difficult but the test succeeded in producing enough variation in results
as to be informative and discriminate different level of competence among doctors.
4.2 Estimation strategy
There are three stages to the analysis. First, we estimate the effect of competence, denoted θ ,
on demand for village clinic services (Q). Then we explore if individuals can infer the quality
of the local doctor by estimating the effect of competence on household perceptions of quality
(S). Finally, we examine whether perceptions and demand are correlated.
Our primary interest is in the relationship between utilization of healthcare at the village
level and doctor competence. To estimate the sign and strength of the relationship between
demand and competence we estimated a probit model with conditional mean
E(Qi,j,k|xi,j,k) = Φ(αθk + β′xi,j,k)
where x is a vector of individual’s characteristics (including disease), doctor’s characteristics
and county dummies. The model was estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors
clustered at village level. We consider a model in which use of healthcare is conditional on
being ill. A similar specification was used to estimate the correlation between demand and the
head of households’ valuations of the local clinic. In particular,
E(Qi′,j,k|xi′,j,k) = Φ(αSj,k + β′xi′,j,k)
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where i′ now refers to the head of the household only.
Finally, the relationship between clinic valuation and doctor’s competence was estimated
using a standard least squares model with clustered standard errors (at village level) and
conditional mean,
E(Si′,j,k|xi′,j,k) = αθk + β′xi′,j,k
5 Results
5.1 Demand and doctor competence
We first examine the relationship between demand for healthcare and the competence of village
doctors2. The main results are shown in Table 3 as marginal effect estimates from a probit
model with standard errors clustered by village. The dependent variable is any visit to the
village doctor conditional on being ill in the past two weeks.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows no evidence of a correlation, positive or negative, between
utilization of village doctors and doctor competence. Columns 2 and 3, respectively, introduce
controls for individual characteristics and categories of disease. In both instances, the lack of
any correlation remains and the marginal effects move closer to zero. In column 4, we include
controls for characteristics of the doctor and see that the result remains robust. Finally, we
include county fixed effects in column 5 that control for unobserved heterogeneity at that
level. The marginal effect on doctor competence remains small with no evidence of statistical
significance.
We have sufficiently tight confidence intervals to rule out reasonably small effect sizes. The
results from column 5 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in doctor competence
has an insignificant effect of 1.7 percentage points on the probability of visiting a village doctor,
relative to a mean of 18 percent. The confidence intervals imply that we can rule out a positive
effect size of 4.7 percentage points. Taken together, the findings suggest that healthcare seeking
behaviour is unresponsive to changes in doctor competence at the village level. We scrutinise
2The determinants of doctors competence are explored in Table A4 in the Appendix. The only statistically
significant variable is the indicator for specialisation in nursing, which appears with a negative coefficient,
suggesting that those individuals trained as nurses obtained lower competence scores on average. In general,
the low adjusted R2 suggests that much of the variation in doctors’ competence was left largely unexplained by
the data. We arrived to the same conclusion when using the standardised competence score.
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our core result with further robustness tests in Section 5.3.
5.2 Perceptions of quality
If health care seeking is unresponsive to more competent doctors, this may be because house-
holds find it difficult to assess the ability of doctors. We therefore study the relationship
between household perceptions of quality of care and doctor competence. Table 4 reports OLS
estimates in which the dependent variable is our overall measure of perceptions of quality.
Column 1 simply regresses perceptions of quality on our measure of doctor competence
without any controls. The coefficient is small and not statistically significant at conventional
levels. When we include controls for individual characteristics and disease groups, in columns 2
and 3 respectively, the coefficient approaches zero. The inclusion of doctors’ characteristics in
column 4 and county fixed effects in column 5 makes little difference to the coefficient and sta-
tistical significance. The estimate in column 5 indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in doctor competence has an insignificant effect of 0.02 standard deviations on perceptions of
quality3.
Table 5 considers whether perceptions are an important determinant of health care seeking.
We see in column 1 that the coefficient on perceptions of quality is strongly positive and
significant, indicating that perceptions of quality matter for health care seeking. A one standard
deviation increase in perceptions of quality is associated with 6 percentage point increase in
use of village doctors. The inclusion of controls for individual characteristics (column 2),
disease groups (column 3), and doctor characteristics (column 4) does not change the result
substantively, if anything increasing the magnitude of the coefficient. Finally, in column 5, the
result is robust to the inclusion of county fixed effects.
Together these results paint a consistent picture. Our measure of doctor competence is
not correlated with utilization of village doctors and this can be reconciled with the fact that
households appear unable to recognise more competent doctors. At the same time perceptions
of quality are an important determinant of healthcare seeking behaviour.
3We also ran separate regressions for each of the seven dimensions of perceptions of quality that make up
our overall score. In no instance is the coefficient on doctor competence significant. In particular, we find no
relationship between household perceptions of the doctor ability and the doctor competence score.
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5.3 Robustness
In this section we perform further robustness checks on our main findings to address a number
of concerns. The results of these tests are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix . First, motivated
by the findings of a study in the Philippines (Peabody et al., 2011), we examine whether there
are non-linearities in the relationship between healthcare utilization and doctor competence
by splitting competence into terciles. Columns 1 to 3 suggests that there is no evidence of
a non-linear relationship. Second, we define the dependent variable as utilization across the
entire sample, irrespective of whether the individual was ill in the past two weeks. As shown
in column 2, the marginal effect is close to zero and far from statistical significance. Third, we
examine the robustness of the results to simpler weighting schemes to construct the measure
of doctor competence. In column 3 we use the raw score and in column 4 the standardised
score. Both the marginal effects of interest are close to zero. Fourth, in column 5, we include
township instead of county fixed effects and find no qualitative change in the result.
Another concern is that doctors may sort into villages based on the characteristics of the
population in that locality. If these same factors are correlated with healthcare utilization,
OLS estimates of the relationship between demand for healthcare and doctor competence will
be biased. Given that village doctors have been in their position for on average 22 years, there
is clearly little turnover and therefore limited scope for sorting. We also show in Table A3 of
the Appendix that doctor competence is not associated with the characteristics of households
in the catchment area of the village doctor.
The focus of this article is the correlation between doctors competence and demand. Of
secondary importance was the relationship between perceptions of quality and demand. A con-
cern with the latter is that demand and peoples perceptions of quality might be simultaneously
determined, in which case the positive association may be biased. In the absence of valid instru-
mental variables in our data, we explored this question from a more structural point of view4.
To this end, we used follow-up household data in 2012 which included similar indicators of
demand and perceptions of quality (but no data on village doctors). This enabled us to fit two
4In our analysis we considered using the village clinic average valuation as an instrument for an individual’s
own valuation of quality. For each individual in the sample, this instrument was calculated as the village
clinic average valuation excluding the respondent’s own valuation. Under random sampling, this instrument is
statistically independent of a respondent’s demand. Unfortunately, the instrument was statistically insignificant
in the first stage equation (p = 0.2023) of the IV-probit procedure, which is suggestive of a very weak instrument.
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parametric models (results available on request) . We firstly estimated a random effects panel
probit using 2011 and 2012 data. This allowed to explore the question of whether valuation
of health services is still correlated with demand once time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
is taken into account. Secondly, we estimated the effect of perceptions of quality in 2011 on
demand in 2012 using a probit model. Under the assumption that health shocks are exogenous
and unforeseen, the coefficient of perceptions of quality in this model would be informative
about the causal effect of valuation on demand. The estimated marginal effect of valuation
on health in all models was around 0.02 and significant (p-value =0.025), thus supporting our
finding that demand and perceptions of quality are positively correlated.
6 Discussion
We studied the relationship between doctor competence and the utilization of health care at
the primary care level using household data on care seeking behaviour linked to an assessment
of health providers’ clinical competence in rural areas of Ningxia province.
Our main finding is that we find no evidence of a correlation between doctor competence
and utilization of healthcare, either positive or negative, with confidence intervals reasonably
tight around zero. In other words, patients in this particular setting do not appear to seek more
care from doctors with higher competence. While we lack exogenous sources of variation in
doctor competence to make causal claims, we show that this result is robust to a large number
of additional controls. In further support of the main result, we find that household perceptions
of quality are an important determinant of care seeking behaviour, yet patients appear unable
to recognize more competent doctors (there is no relationship between doctor competence and
perceptions of quality).
A plausible explanation for this finding is that patients appeared unable to recognize more
competent doctors. There was no relationship between doctor competence and perceptions of
quality. Thus, while patient perceptions played an important role in explaining the demand
of health provider, these perceptions did not reflect the competence of village doctors. Most
likely they reflect more observable aspects of care that are less important to health outcomes.
Note, in particular that, because 98% of our sample are covered by the rural health insurance
program (the New Cooperative Medical Scheme, NCMS) and the benefit package is identical
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within each county, variation in insurance coverage cannot explain variations in demand as our
analyses have controlled for county fixed effects..
Several studies have previously looked at the relationship between the technical quality of
care and patient satisfaction, with mixed findings. Leonard (2008) provides convincing evidence
of a positive relationship in Tanzania. Results in Hanson et al. (2004), which are consistent
with our findings, suggest that patients demand of provider is sensitive to quality in terms
of household perceptions of quality, and that interpersonal quality is more important than
either technical quality or system-related factors in Cyprus. Evidence from the Philippines also
suggests that quality is a predictor of patient satisfaction, but the relationship appears non-
linear (Peabody et al., 2011). At low levels of the quality score, improvements in quality exert
a negative influence on patient satisfaction that becomes positive at higher levels of quality. By
contrast, other studies find no evidence of a link in a variety of different settings (Chang et al.,
2006; Das and Sohnesen, 2006; Erikson, 1986).
Our study goes beyond patient satisfaction to study whether individuals respond to more
competent doctors in their health care seeking behaviour. The fact they do not suggests that
there are information asymmetries for health providers to exploit if the incentives are there to do
so. Several recent studies in China highlight well the agency problem inherent in the relationship
between doctor and patient. Lu (2014) experimentally manipulated the incentives faced by
doctors to show that when doctors could retain drug profits, they prescribed more drugs,
more expensive drugs and more unnecessary drugs. Meanwhile, Currie et al. (2011) varied
the knowledge of simulated patients showing that doctors prescribed fewer antibiotics when
faced with more knowledgeable patients. Pay-for-performance offers a potential solution to the
agency problem although such schemes can be complex to design and implement. Evidence from
a study of the introduction of pay-for-peformance in Ningxia province suggests that incentives
can be improved to reduce the excessively high antibiotic prescription rates (Yip et al., 2014).
The findings of the study imply that improvements in the technical quality of village doctors
alone would be ineffective in shifting the pattern of healthcare seeking away from higher tiers
of care towards the primary care level, other things being equal. This means that, firstly,
patients are unlikely to receive treatment in the most adequate facilities and, secondly, market
and competitive forces devised to incentivise providers towards better technical quality may
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not have much effect on patients’ demand. Of course, the government could take an active role
by improving and publicising information on the quality of providers but this would require
a functioning management information system. Even then, it would only be effective if the
patients have adequate knowledge to differentiate good and bad clinical quality of care. How
then could the current situation of inefficient use of higher level facilities for case that could
be dealt with at the primary care level be improved? Gatekeeping is an obvious candidate and
there are already pilots of such a policy in China. However, the concern is that if quality of
care provided by villages doctors do not satisfy patients expectation, such a system will not
succeed or sustain.
In thinking about the implications of the findings we note a number of limitations. First, we
are cautious in claiming the results are free of omitted variable bias. It remains possible that the
finding of zero correlation between utilization and doctor competence is driven by unobserved
factors although there is no evidence that this the case from our robustness checks5. Second,
our data and analysis are cross-sectional in nature. However, patients’ assessment of the village
doctors’ technical quality can change overtime with repeated encounters and thus affect their
utilization behaviour, which our cross-sectional data cannot capture. The empirical literature
on this is quite scarce because longitudinal data with the same individuals having repeated
visits over the observed period is required (Corno, 2014). Third, we measured competence
by clinical knowledge not the actual quality of care delivered to patients. Our findings may
be spurious if the actual quality of care provided by doctors is unrelated to this measure of
competence. This could be because more competent doctors fail to exert more effort or lack the
resources to translate better knowledge into clinically effective care. While it would have been
preferable to have process measures of quality from, say, standardised patients (Sylvia et al.,
2014; Das et al., 2012), it is likely that knowledge is a strong predictor of practice. Fourth, the
external validity of the results can always be challenged. Ningxia is the third least developed
region in China and it is possible people living elsewhere where education levels are higher are
more able to evaluate the quality of care they receive.
The evidence we have presented is suggestive, and is sufficiently interesting to spur future
5The ability of our results to unveil a causal effect depends on whether utilisation levels would remain the
same regardless of doctors’ competence. This would not be the case if, for example, doctors’ competence
positively affect public health in an area or if the characteristics of the area attract a more or less skilful type of
doctor. Thus the overall selection bias can be negative or positive, and we have no way of determining its sign.
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research with stronger methods. For example, one of the authors of this paper is currently
conducting a Randomized Control Trial of a quality improvement programme in which it will
be possible to see whether perceptions of quality and demand are influenced by exogenous
changes in clinical quality. Given the current lack of evidence on the question at the heart of
the paper, we believe these findings to be an important contribution to the debate on whether
patients and the public at large are able to evaluate quality beyond the more observable aspects
of care.
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Table 1: Household Survey: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Male 0.519 (0.5) 28886
Age 31.543 (19.957) 28886
Never attended school 0.269 (0.443) 22219
Elementary school 0.328 (0.469) 22219
Middle school 0.292 (0.455) 22219
High school or more 0.112 (0.315) 22219
Hui 0.52 (0.5) 28886
Log-consumption 9.860 (0.671) 28882
Health care utilisation (Individual).
Ill in the past 14 days 0.135 (0.342) 28886
No treatment 0.151 (0.358) 3898
Self-treatment 0.336 (0.472) 3898
Attended village clinic 0.181 (0.385) 3898
Attended private clinic 0.051 (0.221) 3898
Attended township health centre 0.125 (0.330) 3898
Attended county hospital 0.131 (0.338) 3898
Perceptions of Quality (Head of Household).
Waiting time 4.188 (0.875) 6428
Environment 3.694 (0.906) 6427
Physican politeness 3.866 (0.908) 6428
Physican description of illness 3.67 (0.965) 6427
Drug availability 2.93 (1.068) 6417
Equipment sophistication 2.705 (1.11) 6414
Physician ability 3.42 (0.956) 6484
Standardised Score 0.007 (0.980) 6404
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Table 2: Summary statistics: Village Doctors
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Male 0.813 0.391 240
Age 44.227 12.3 238
Barefoot doctor 0.663 0.474 240
Education: < Middle School 0.389 0.489 239
Education: High School 0.126 0.332 239
Education: Vocational School 0.448 0.498 239
Education: > College 0.038 0.191 239
Occupation: Village doctor 0.951 0.217 239
Occupation: Midwife 0.03 0.167 239
Specialisation: Chinese medicine 0.057 0.233 239
Specialisation: Western medicine 0.254 0.437 239
Specialisation: Western and Chinese medicine 0.352 0.479 239
Specialisation: Nursing 0.012 0.110 239
Specialisation: Public Health 0.169 0.375 239
Experience 21.554 14.317 240
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Table 3: Conditional Demand (Marginal Effects)
Basic Individual & Household Disease Doctor’s Regional
Characteristics Groups Characteristics Indicators
Competence 0.0164 0.0120 0.0146 0.0178 0.0172
0.0169 0.0162 0.0160 0.0157 0.0152
Individual Characteristics.
Male 0.0114 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0011
0.0100 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101
Age -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0013
0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
Age2 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hui -0.0513∗ -0.0450 -0.0396 -0.0565∗
0.0257 0.0248 0.0244 0.0282
Head of household/household characteristics.
Elementary School 0.0096 0.0124 0.0057 0.0075
0.0215 0.0212 0.0215 0.0213
Middle School -0.0107 -0.0095 -0.0134 -0.0101
0.0226 0.0224 0.0230 0.0231
High School -0.0378 -0.0406 -0.0483 -0.0466
0.0308 0.0294 0.0273 0.0274
Migrant 0.0044 0.0070 0.0088 0.0056
0.0171 0.0168 0.0170 0.0172
Log-consumption -0.0086 -0.0169 -0.0201 -0.0203
0.0131 0.0131 0.0131 0.0132
Doctors’ characteristics.
Experience 0.0019∗ 0.0019∗
0.0009 0.0009
Barefoot doctor 0.0238 0.0259
0.0276 0.0276
High School 0.1031∗ 0.1115∗
0.0462 0.0455
Vocational School 0.0486 0.0538
0.0275 0.0285
College -0.0250 -0.0174
0.0457 0.0434
Disease Dummy N N Y Y Y
County Fixed Effects N N N N Y
N 3811 3811 3774 3720 3720
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Table 4: Perception and competence.
Basic Individual & Household Disease Doctor’s Regional
Characteristics Groups Characteristics Indicators
Competence 0.0372 0.0171 0.0162 0.0138 0.0167
0.0419 0.0416 0.0417 0.0407 0.0387
Individual traits.
Male 0.0754 0.0893 0.0665 0.0617
0.0944 0.0936 0.1003 0.0993
Age -0.0090 -0.0099 -0.0093 -0.0146
0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0078
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Hui -0.1676∗∗ -0.1696∗∗ -0.1496∗ -0.1636∗
0.0638 0.0638 0.0647 0.0685
Head of household/household characteristics.
Elementary School 0.0340 0.0335 0.0345 0.0601
0.0396 0.0396 0.0392 0.0390
Middle School -0.0374 -0.0371 -0.0394 -0.0015
0.0502 0.0500 0.0505 0.0520
High School 0.1231 0.1217 0.1220 0.0986
0.0703 0.0705 0.0693 0.0686
Migrant -0.0533 -0.0518 -0.0488 -0.0561
0.0376 0.0375 0.0371 0.0359
Log-consumption -0.0205 -0.0170 -0.0320 0.0245
0.0273 0.0272 0.0274 0.0241
Doctor’s characteristics.
Experience 0.0008 0.0025
0.0029 0.0028
Barefoot 0.1072 0.1127
0.0913 0.0843
High School 0.0865 0.1043
0.1006 0.0930
Vocational School 0.1476 0.1672∗
0.0805 0.0836
College -0.0975 -0.0642
0.2681 0.2524
Disease dummy N N Y Y Y
County Fixed Effects N N N N Y
N 6353 6351 6351 6237 6237
Table 5: Conditional Demand and Perception.
Basic Individual Disease Doctor’s Regional
Characteristics Groups Characteristics Indicators
Valuation of clinic 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗∗
0.0111 0.0105 0.0098 0.0098 0.0095
Individual traits.
Male 0.0113 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0001
0.0100 0.0098 0.0098 0.0099
Age -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0012
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011
Age2 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hui -0.0457 -0.0402 -0.0360 -0.0498
0.0239 0.0228 0.0226 0.0264
Head of household/household characteristics.
Elementary School 0.0054 0.0087 -0.0012 -0.0004
0.0203 0.0199 0.0204 0.0203
Middle School -0.0061 -0.0046 -0.0094 -0.0066
0.0218 0.0214 0.0221 0.0221
High School -0.0460 -0.0477 -0.0563∗ -0.0536∗
0.0291 0.0276 0.0258 0.0261
Migrant 0.0018 0.0039 0.0092 0.0070
0.0174 0.0171 0.0172 0.0175
Log-consumption -0.0103 -0.0188 -0.0178 -0.0203
0.0126 0.0125 0.0124 0.0123
Doctor’s characteristics.
Experience 0.0019∗ 0.0018∗
0.0008 0.0008
Barefoot doctor 0.0193 0.0219
0.0260 0.0255
High School 0.1019∗ 0.1090∗
0.0441 0.0438
Vocational School 0.0461 0.0504
0.0250 0.0257
College 0.0042 0.0102
0.0494 0.0473
Disease dummy N N Y Y Y
County Fixed Effects N N N N Y
N 3843 3843 3806 3685 3685
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Figure 1: Density estimators: Number of questions answered correctly (left panel) and
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Table A2: Robustness Check: Demand Equation.
Tertiles Unconditional Raw Standardised Township
Demand Scores Scores Indicators
Competence 0.0006 0.0254
0.0004 0.0144
Competence (raw scores) 0.0043
0.0028
Competence (Standardised scores) 0.0207
0.0130
2nd Tertile -0.0046
0.0274
3nd Tertile 0.0455
0.0307
Individual traits.
Male 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0015 0.0008
0.0101 0.0003 0.0100 0.0100 0.0101
Age -0.0013 -0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0015
0.0011 0.0000 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hui -0.0589∗ -0.0010 -0.0611∗ -0.0609∗ -0.0282
0.0278 . 0.0283 0.0282 0.0230
Head of household/household characteristics.
Elementary School 0.0042 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0135
0.0210 0.0006 0.0210 0.0211 0.0206
Middle School -0.0112 -0.0003 -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0087
0.0229 0.0006 0.0232 0.0232 0.0224
High School -0.0503 -0.0011 -0.0491 -0.0502 -0.0493
0.0268 0.0006 0.0273 0.0272 0.0263
Migrant 0.0069 0.0003 0.0069 0.0064 0.0044
0.0170 0.0005 0.0173 0.0173 0.0165
Log-consumption -0.0196 -0.0007 -0.0206 -0.0205 -0.0201
0.0133 0.0004 0.0135 0.0135 0.0123
Doctor’s characteristics.
Experience 0.0020∗ 0.0000 0.0020∗ 0.0021∗ 0.0022∗
0.0009 0.0000 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
Barefoot doctor 0.0199 0.0006 0.0265 0.0272 0.0309
0.0275 0.0007 0.0280 0.0280 0.0277
High School 0.1132∗ 0.0036∗ 0.1156∗ 0.1142∗ 0.1095∗
0.0457 0.0018 0.0460 0.0458 0.0459
Vocational School 0.0559∗ 0.0015 0.0531 0.0523 0.0626∗
0.0282 0.0008 0.0286 0.0286 0.0271
College -0.0201 -0.0008 -0.0542 -0.0561 -0.0035
0.0433 0.0010 0.0457 0.0454 0.0546
Disease Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
County Dummy Y Y Y Y N
Township Dummy N N N N Y
N 3725 27605 3655 3645 3720
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Table A3: Regression of Competence and household characteristics.
Male 0.0651
0.4792
Age -0.0140
0.0694
Age2 0.0001
0.1350
Elementary School 0.0642
0.0966
Middle School 0.0064
0.8991
High School 0.1080
0.1170
Migrant -0.0566
0.1112
Hui -0.1700∗
0.0108
Log-consumption 0.0336
0.1533
Parasitic disease -0.0494
0.9344
Malignant Neoplasm 0.6780∗∗
0.0079
Benign Neoplasm 0.7581
0.2273
Nutritional/Endocrine/Metabolic 0.1534
0.5374
Disease of blood/pancreas 0.5959∗∗∗
0.0000
Mental disease -0.4399
0.1375
Nervous system 0.0683
0.7348
Eye 0.4683
0.0737
Ear 0.8365∗∗∗
0.0000
Circulatory system 0.0564
0.6346
Respiratory 0.0012
0.9812
Digestive 0.1499
0.0705
Genitourinary -0.1497
0.5416
Skin -0.2431
0.3036
Musculoskeletal 0.1309
0.0977
Congenital -0.1953∗
0.0104
Injury/poisoning/burn -0.2693
0.1253
Other 0.4595∗
0.0357
County Dummies Y
N 6489
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Table A4: Least squares estimates and adjusted R2 of a regression of doctors’ estimated
competence. Education and experience both have a positive effect on doctors’ compe-
tence, however this effect is not robust to specification and is, in general, not statistically
significant. The only statistically significant variable is the indicator for specialisation
in nursing, which appears with a negative coefficient, suggesting that those individuals
trained as nurses obtained lower competence scores on average. In general, the low ad-
justed R2 suggests that much of the variation in doctors’ competence was left largely
unexplained by the data. We arrived to the same conclusion when using the standardised
competence score.
Education Experience Specialty Major County
High School 0.0274 -0.0337 -0.0087 0.0069 -0.0207
0.8837 0.8604 0.9637 0.9724 0.9204
Vocational School 0.2641 0.1772 0.1966 0.1543 0.0631
0.0746 0.2375 0.1859 0.3339 0.6894
College 1.0961∗∗∗ 0.6950∗ 0.7279∗ 0.5136 0.5199
0.0000 0.0157 0.0119 0.1016 0.1093
Experience: 5-9 Years 0.3104 0.3153 -0.0349 -0.0797
0.4918 0.4690 0.9274 0.8258
Experience: 10-19 Years 0.7498 0.7444 0.4581 0.4475
0.0902 0.0845 0.2155 0.1983
Experience: 20-29 Years 0.1986 0.2204 -0.1073 -0.0991
0.6552 0.6002 0.7712 0.7774
Experience: 30-39 Years 0.2461 0.2644 -0.0618 -0.0646
0.5831 0.5329 0.8687 0.8564
Experience: 40 + 0.2229 0.2349 -0.1322 -0.2207
0.6299 0.5974 0.7456 0.5739
Specialty: Village Doctor 0.1631 0.1683 0.3379
0.6607 0.6783 0.4152
Specialty: Midwife 0.4769 0.4891 0.7078
0.4682 0.4508 0.2842
Major: Western Medicine -0.0351 -0.1211
0.8977 0.6873
Major: Chinese + Western Medicine 0.2836 0.1217
0.2984 0.6845
Major: Nursing -1.5820∗∗ -1.5649∗∗
0.0049 0.0039
Major: Public Health 0.1847 0.1419
0.5507 0.6606
Major: Other 0.0569 -0.0173
0.8465 0.9576
Barefoot doctor -0.0649
0.6177
Male 0.1220
0.4488
Yanchi 0.3601
0.0605
Tongxin -0.1905
0.3266
Pengyang -0.1440
0.4859
Xiji -0.1150
0.5371
Intercept -0.1655 -0.4592 -0.6511 -0.4313 -0.4654
0.1594 0.3041 0.1649 0.4079 0.4118
N 239 239 239 239 239
R2 0.0468 0.0975 0.1008 0.1491 0.1787
Adjusted R2 0.0346 0.0661 0.0614 0.0919 0.0993
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Figure A1: Item characteristic curves and proportion of correct answers by estimated
competence (Part I). Actual values are computed as the proportion of correct answers in
intervals of length 0.3 in the competence domain.
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Figure A2: Item characteristic curves and proportion of correct answers by estimated
competence (Part II). Actual values are computed as the proportion of correct answers in
intervals of length 0.3 in the competence domain.
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